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ABSTRACT 
Post-conflict societies emerging from protracted violence often struggle in the critical 
transition from short-term oriented emergency relief assistance—functioning as an 
immediate stabilizing mechanism during decades of protracted conflict—to longer-term 
solutions intended to rebuild the nation. This post-conflict evolution is complicated by 
the potentially destabilizing reintroduction of returning refugees and internally displaced 
persons. Using South Sudan as the case study, this thesis analyzes the short and long-term 
tradeoffs and implications of immediate versus durable repatriation strategies for 
stabilization and reconstruction of post-conflict societies. I argue that reintegration 
strategies must provide a long-term development approach; a long-term approach directly 
contributes to the future prospects and viable stability of a post-conflict environment. 
This thesis concludes that while there have been concerted efforts towards contributing to 
the reintegration of returnees in South Sudan, the critical element lies in the ability of 
such post-conflict nations to provide long-term sustainable opportunities—livelihoods—
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis analyzes the challenges associated with the reintegration of returning 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in post-war society, and determines the 
sustainable approach for confronting these challenges in order to successfully obtain 
conflict transformation and stabilization. A durable solution to refugee crises requires 
recognition of the potential impact of key socio-economic issues in each post-war 
environment. This recognition, both in analysis and in practice, is imperative for a 
broader and long-term approach to sustainable peace building. I argue that sustainable 
reintegration of returning refugees as a solution to protracted conflict and forced 
displacement is essential. From this lens, the research argues that a post-conflict society 
devoid of a long-term reintegration strategy leaves the particularly vulnerable 
populations—the returnees—in a cycle of aid dependency, and contributes to the re-
ignition of violence and armed conflict.  
Using the emerging post-conflict nation of South Sudan as a case study, this 
research analyzes a crucial element of successful reintegration programs for returnees in a 
post-conflict society. Contrary to the standard short-term emergent aid and reintegration 
approach of many relief agencies and policies, this thesis argues that the sustainability of 
repatriation programs for returnees is achieved by a long-term—livelihood—strategy. I 
conclude that reintegration programs rely on the livelihood element as the vital 
component towards stabilization and reconstruction. Furthermore, this research argues 
that the livelihoods approach provides returning South Sudanese the means to 
economically sustain themselves whereby minimizing aid dependency and fostering an 
environment of community integration—essential components for ending the re-ignition 
of violence. Finally, I conclude that a livelihood approach not only ensures sustainable 
reintegration for returnees, this approach also directly contributes to the peace and 
stability of this new nation. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
This thesis uses South Sudan as a case study for analyzing short-term versus long-
term strategy approaches to reintegrating refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). Refugee crises constitute at once a humanitarian issue, a security issue, and a 
development issue. Michael Gabaudan argues, “In a country like South Sudan, where the 
national government is challenged by conflict, international donors are in the driving seat 
when it comes to providing aid and meeting the changing needs of people.”1 Gabaudan 
argues for the need of relief agencies to bridge this humanitarian and development gap.2 
While South Sudan is not a unique case highlighting a state suffering from a refugee and 
IDP crisis, every crisis is unique and may yield valuable lessons.  
The consequences of war have been profound for large numbers of South 
Sudanese and their neighbors. The immense displaced crisis in Sudan is inevitably linked 
to the country’s internal challenges. Furthermore, South Sudan’s independence has been 
accompanied by the challenges of building a new nation. The viability of this new nation 
is tested in the fragile environment it inherited after a long war of liberation. The most 
vulnerable populations, the refugees and IDPs, have been slowly returning to their 
homeland—and, they remain vulnerable with little to return to and to a setting of 
insecurity and often-persistent violence. The case of South Sudan highlights the 
importance of post-conflict societies to plan and implement a long-term development 
strategy in order to establish stability and sustainable return.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
While South Sudan provides an important platform for exposing the need for 
long-term reintegration programs, it also proves to be difficult to determine concrete 
results, as the country is just two years old at the time of writing. Most data derives from 
humanitarian agencies that have produced reports from the field on current programs and 
                                                 
1 Michel Gabaudan, “From Emergency Aid to Development Aid: Agencies Failing to Connect,” The 





possible outcomes. This research does, however, provides an opportunity to analyze the 
dynamics of refugee assistance as they unfold, highlighting the gap between providing 
short-term and sustainable long-term opportunities for returnee management tin South 
Sudan. Additionally, this thesis analyzes the linkages of security and protection—
especially related to returning refugees and IDPs—with long-term economic growth 
contributing to stabilization. More than ever, it is imperative that this new nation make 
strides towards future stability and provide protection and opportunity for its most 
vulnerable population—the returning displaced groups.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Using the case study approach, this research reviews the origins and evolution of 
the new nation of South Sudan and traces the roots of its refugee crisis while analyzing 
the strategies leveraged to mitigate the outcomes of the crisis. Through this approach, this 
thesis concurrently analyzes the multifaceted causes of the conflict in South Sudan and 
the lifecycle dynamics of forced displacement and reintegration. This analytical 
framework is based on qualitative research and is bolstered by theories of state building 
and the established concepts of “failed state” and “sustainable livelihood.” This model 
focuses not only on the underlying and far-reaching causes of the conflict, but also on the 
dynamics of forced displacement in South Sudan, as an example of an emerging post-
conflict nation. This study relies on scholarship surrounding reintegration in post-conflict 
societies—and, humanitarian reports analyzing the more recent on-the-ground facts and 
data. Provided this context, the subsequent sections will briefly summarize the view of 
literature surrounding the conflict leading to the independence of South Sudan and define 
the key terms used in this study. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
The return of refugees to their homeland is a noble achievement in the aftermath 
of protracted violence and civil war. However, a return to a country of origin is not 
enough for breaking the cycle of violence, conflict, and forced displacement. In order to 
mitigate the potential threat to stability that returnee reintegration entails, it is important 
to understand the implications of reintegration programs. Experts in peace and security 
 4 
studies consider reintegration of returning refugees as a part of peace building, which 
aims at preventing war-torn countries from relapsing into violence.3 The increasing 
awareness and engagement in the challenges of return has grown by government and 
refugee and migration policy-makers, and return increasingly has been viewed as having 
implications for not just individuals, but also for communities of origin and the wider 
process of redevelopment.4  
However, the literature reveals that return is not enough to promote peace; rather, 
return needs to be sustainable.5 In this case, return is ‘sustainable’ if the returnee is not 
forced back into displacement again; therefore, sustainability relies on peace and security 
of the environment.6 Thus, UNHCR states in its Dialogue on Voluntary Repatriation and 
Sustainable Reintegration in Africa, “Experience shows that if the issue of sustainability 
or reintegration of refugee and displaced populations is not addressed properly, the 
countries concerned will almost inevitably slide back into conflict.”7  
Short and long-term reconstruction and development strategies in emerging post-
conflict environments require defining the distinction between these two approaches. The 
literature reveals that post-conflict emergent aid strategy must be distinguished from that 
of longer-term development aid strategy. Post-conflict aid objectives include providing 
short-term immediate emergency relief and reconstruction efforts such as rebuilding 
infrastructure and roads.8 Fulvio Attina, a prominent analyst, argues that while conflict is 
the main driver of insecurity in fragile environments, a short-term strategy remains rooted 
                                                 
3 Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (New York: Routlege, 
2007).  
4Richard Black and Saskia Gent, “Defining, Measuring and Influencing Sustainable Return: The Case 
of the Balkans,” Development Research Centre on Migration (Brighton, United Kingdom: Sussex Centre 
for Migration Research, 2004). 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Sustainable Reintegration of Returnees and 
Displaced Populations in Africa,” Discussion Paper No. 2 (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2004).  
8 Graciana Del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic 
Reconstruction (England: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
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in conflict whereby limiting the framework to the “conflict-oriented narrative,” rather 
than promoting sustainable outcomes beyond this simple “intervention horizon.”9 A 
short-term, or humanitarian aid, strategy in a post-conflict society primarily focuses on 
providing immediate needs with the sole goal of saving lives.10 Much of the literature 
argues that the short-term emergent aid strategy prevents a holistic and sustainable 
framework for reconstruction to be implemented11—further adding to the dependence on 
aid thereby stunting opportunities for internal growth and stabilization. Additionally, 
Fulvio argues that the primary concern of this immediate-focused approach is to 
“…contain or halt violence (‘conflict management’) and tackle short-term emergency 
needs in order to create favorable conditions for the parties to negotiate a peace 
agreement (‘conflict resolution’).”12  
In contrast, the literature reveals that long-term, or reconstruction aid, aims at 
improving and preserving the living conditions of the populations.13 The focal point of 
development aid is long-term growth, often with a focus on economic development.14 
Graciana Del Castillo argues: 
Many of the civil wars and other forms of internal conflicts of recent 
decades resulted from economic and political underdevelopment, were 
often triggered by ethnic, religious, or ideological factors, and involved 
failed states or breakaway provinces or territories.15  
Additionally, much of the literature determines that the longer-term reintegration 
and reconstruction approach is especially challenged in a stagnant economic 
environment.16 The literature also reveals that a key element in a long-term development 
                                                 
9 Fulvio Attina, The Politics and Policies of Relief, Aid, and Reconstruction (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012). 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Graciana Del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic 
Reconstruction (England: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., 9.  
 6 
strategy includes the participation of the locals.17 In fact, as determined by the study of 
South Sudan, this approach allows returnees to participate in their own development 
opportunities, rather than continuing the dependence on the aid. In addition, a long-term 
strategy—focused on livelihoods—empowers struggling post-conflict societies whereby 
involving them in the nation’s path of stabilization and reconstruction. 
The elements confronting forced displacement and returnee reintegration in a 
post-war context is a complex task. Many analysts agree that successful reintegration is 
imperative for national reconciliation and for the prevention of reoccurring violence.18 
Elizabeth Colson has argued that ethnographic methodology on forced migration and 
refugee studies must acknowledge the complexity of forced displacement and not solely 
limit the examination to a single aspect.19 She argues that discreet factors spanning 
multiple disciples fundamentally influence the nature of refugee dynamics.  
Given the multitude of analytical orientations and prisms of analysis suggested by 
Colson, various theoretical approaches to refugee studies highlight the convergence, 
divergence of, and difficulties in conceptualizing refugee return and reintegration.20 One 
such scholarly camp posits that comprehensive responses to post-war challenges are 
critical to addressing issues of failed states,21 broken bonds between state and society,22 
socio-economic problems, as well as human rights.23 According to some experts, larger 
issues such as security, economic development, and human rights are at the origin of 
                                                 
17 Peter Oakley, Projects with People: The Practice of Participation in Rural Development (Geneva: 
International Labor Office, 1991).  
18 Ibid., 14.  
19 Elizabeth Colson, “Linkages Methodology: No Man is an Island,” Journal of Refugee Studies 20, 
no. 2 (2007): 320–333.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Constance Anthony, “Africa’s Refugee Crisis: State Building in Political Perspective,” 
International Migration Review 25, no.3 (1991): 574–591. 
22 Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004).   
23 Anne Hammerstad, “Making or Breaking the Conflict Cycle: The Relationship between 
Underdevelopment, Conflict and Forced Migration” (Oxford, England: Refugee Studies Centre, University 
of Oxford, 2005).   
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conflicts that generate millions of refugees.24 In post-conflict situations, the sustainable 
reintegration of refugees depends mostly on the solutions to these same broad issues. It is 
further argued that the risk of renewed armed conflict is generally high and that unless 
typical post-war challenges are properly met; hard-earned stability is easily jeopardized 
in post-war contexts.  
1. Conflict in South Sudan Defined 
The objective of this section and the subsequent definition sections is to analyze 
existing scholarship on the historical progression of South Sudan’s independence, the 
resultant refugee and IDP crises, and the challenges to reintegration through the lens of 
four key topical areas. Specifically, existing scholarship on refugees, returnees and 
reintegration, livelihoods, and protection, enhance understanding of the central elements 
that shape the character of the post-conflict return of displaced populations. The 
protracted conflict in South Sudan reflects a diverse set of drivers. According to much of 
the literature, the conflict is often viewed as: conflicts within Sudan, conflicts within 
South Sudan, and the outstanding political and economic issues between the two 
countries.25 The root causes of the conflicts vary in scope, from religious tensions to 
communal, inter-, and intra-tribal regional conflicts or competition over dwindling 
natural resources and political power positions.26 Persistence of conflict has remained 
modern Sudan’s defining characteristic. From the outside, the delineations of conflict in 
Sudan may seem obvious given the ethnic and religious complexity of the predominantly 




                                                 
24 Constance Anthony, “Africa’s Refugee Crisis: State Building in Political Perspective,” 
International Migration Review 25, no. 3 (1991): 574–591. 
25Matthew LeRiche and Matthew Arnold, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
26 Anne Hammerstad, “Making or Breaking the Conflict Cycle: The Relationship between 
Underdevelopment, Conflict and Forced Migration” (Oxford, England: Refugee Studies Centre, University 
of Oxford, 2005).   
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Christians mainly residing in the south. Internally, however, the country is much more 
complex, with sharp cleavages that manifest along ethnic, racial, tribal, geographic, and 
religious lines.27  
Sudan has represented small kingdoms and principalities from the beginning, 
when Egypt conquered and unified the northern portion of the country, while the British 
colonized the southern region.28 Together, they ruled the territory known as “Sudan” in a 
co-dominion arrangement. Egypt’s control in the north contributed to the spread of Islam 
in the north, while British influence in the south prevented Islam from gaining converts 
there. In the south, the non-Arab tribes retained a mix of traditional religions and some 
converts to Christianity.29 In order to properly frame this discussion of conflict in South 
Sudan with the key factors and challenges shaping the refugee and IDP crises, it is 
important to examine how the literature defines the terms: refugees and internally 
displaced persons, returnees and reintegration, livelihood, and protection. 
2. Refugees Defined 
According to the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, a 
refugee is someone who flees from one country to another and thereby crosses an 
international border.30 This conceptualization draws its meaning from Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights that not only recognizes the right of a person to 
seek refuge from persecution in another country but expands upon that notion by stating 
that a refugee is one who:  
…owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, 
or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
                                                 
27Douglas H. Johnson, Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 2006). 
28 Ibid.  
29Matthew LeRiche and Matthew Arnold, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
30 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, United States Committee for Refugees 
World Refugee Survey (January 1, 1999), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a8ccc.html. 
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country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing  to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.31  
This definition has subsequently formed the cornerstone for how refugees are 
assigned their legal statuses. Refugee status is determined and defined by the 1950 
Statutes of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol, and the 1969 
Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU).32 Refugee status designation is a state level 
activity; however, in the absence of formalized or functional national refugee status 
determination systems, UNHCR exercises its international mandate to assign refugee 
status through its administered processes.33 These processes are used to differentiate the 
refugee from asylum seekers and thereby afford them the benefits associated with their 
newly received legal designation. Of note, the processes can be tailored to suit the 
individual or scaled to meet the needs or a group and may vary in implementation 
between UNHCR offices.34   
In contrast to these expansive definitions of refugees, British human rights activist 
Andrew Shacknove argues, “refugee status should only be granted to persons whose 
government fails to protect their basic needs, who have no remaining recourse other than 
to seek international restitution of these needs, and who are so situated that international 
assistance is possible.”35 Most South Sudanese refugees fit Shacknove’s preconditions as 
they can be found in bordering countries such as Chad and Kenya and are living in 
precarious living circumstances. Many of their shelters are made of fabrics or sticks, 
                                                 
31 United Nations General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” United 
Nations Treaty Series, 189 (1951, July): 137, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3be01b964.html  
32 Ibid.  
33 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in 
Urban Areas (September 2009): 11–12. 
34 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Procedural Standards for Refugee Status 
Determination Under UNHCR’s Mandate (November 20, 2003): 1–2, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/42d66dd84.html 
35Andrew E. Shacknove, “Who is a Refugee?” Ethics, 95, no. 2 (January 1985): 274–284.   
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which are very poor protection against extreme weather conditions often found in this 
region of Africa. The rainy season further exacerbates the humanitarian situation, making 
their settlements even more inaccessible to international humanitarian agencies.  
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are characterized by the same conditions as refugees, 
but have not actually crossed an international border. In many ways, IDPs can find 
themselves in a particularly vulnerable position, as they are still close and prone to the 
violence that they fled from. In addition, many IDPs are not as likely to receive relief 
assistance as those who crossed the international border. Relief agencies are often unable 
to reach IDPs due to security risks.  
3. Returnees and Reintegration Defined 
The term “returnee” covers a broad spectrum of people, with different reasons for 
returning and very different economic and social prospects.36 According to a few experts, 
Sara Pantuliano et al, there are three main groups, comprising both men and women, of a 
yet undetermined size:  
1. Well-educated returnees, many of whom were part of the Southern 
Diaspora during the civil war, living as far afield as the US and Cuba as 
well as neighboring Kenya and Uganda.  Some also returning from 
Khartoum. 
2. Semi-skilled returnees, both IDPs and refugees, many of whom gained 
their skills and experience during their displacement.  
3. Unskilled returnees who had no chance to develop skills during 
displacement, especially if they ended up in rural areas.37 
Officials of the GoSS and international agencies in the field stress the importance 
of reintegration of returnees. However, beyond this broadly stated concern, 
‘reintegration’ seems to mean different things to different individuals and organizations.  
 
 
                                                 
36 Sara Pantuliano, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Paul Murphy and Irina Mosel, The Long Road Home: 
Opportunities and Obstacles to the Reintegration of IDPs and Refugees returning to Southern Sudan and 
the Three Areas (London, England: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, 2008).  
37 Ibid.   
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 The social instability caused by conflicts and people’s movements in search of human 
security and livelihood opportunities seem to have added to the complexity of 
reintegration.  
Reintegration implies a reunion or a coherent regrouping of a community that 
disintegrated due to war and displacement. South Sudan is an interesting case, though, as 
the return process also involves integration of different groups for the first time.  
UNHCR, which actively engages in contributing to reintegration, defines reintegration as 
“the progressive establishment of conditions which enable returnees and their 
communities to exercise their social, economic, civil, political and cultural rights, and on 
that basis to enjoy peaceful, productive and dignified lives.”38 The GoSS offers the 
following definition of reintegration in the Land Act of 2009, “Reintegration means the 
re-entry of formerly internally displaced persons into the social, economic, cultural and 
political fabric of their original community.”39 
South Sudanese returning to their homeland after the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), and after independence, particularly face challenges in the setting of a 
lack of basic infrastructure and means of living. Due to the harsh conditions of the 
environment and the measure of destruction that took place to the overall land of South 
Sudan in the aftermath of decades of civil war, resources crucial for human survival and 
creation of viable livelihoods are severely limited or have been completely destroyed. 
This setting can be especially difficult for returnees and those in their home communities 
to re-build their lives. 
4. Livelihoods Defined 
According to an expert in approaches to sustainable livelihoods for the rural poor, 
Diana Carney, the concept of ‘livelihood’ is analytically defined as “comprising the 
capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living,” and has been identified 
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as a framework or approach to poverty reduction, rather than just components of social 
policy.40 Of note, livelihood strategy promotes involvement and ownership from South 
Sudanese in managing their own economic status, rather than having to rely on relief aid 
packages for survival. The concept of livelihoods became prominent in the mid-1980s, 
particularly with work by Robert Chambers and the Institute of Development Studies at 
the University of Sussex.41 Chambers and Conway defined a livelihood as “the 
capabilities, assets and strategies required for a means of living.”42 At its most basic, a 
‘livelihood approach,’ according to Chambers, is one that takes as its starting point the 
actual livelihood strategies of people; it looks at where people are, what they have and 
what their needs and interests are. 43  
Livelihood activities may range from agriculture support, market and income 
support or influencing policies on land rights. Livelihood strategies according to another 
expert:  
…encompass what people do, such as agriculture and wage labor, and 
what they have, including their natural (land, forest, products, water), 
physical (livestock, shelter, tools, materials), social (extended family and 
other social networks), financial (income, credit, investments) and human 
assets (education, skills, and health).44   
Livelihoods in South Sudan have often been cited as linked to both rich and 
abundant natural resources and the terrible consequences of violent civil conflict.45 The 
conflict also took a devastating toll on livelihoods. Farmers reduced their plantings, 
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21st Century, Discussion Paper 296 (Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 1992). 
42 Ibid.   
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(Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 1995).   
44 Sorcha Callaghan and Susanne Jaspars, Challenging Choice: Protection and Livelihoods in 
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(London, England: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, 2010).  
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especially on land distant from their homes; access to markets and social facilities was 
disrupted; and diversified livelihood activities, such as fishing and hunting, were 
constrained.46  Livelihood systems in South Sudan are highly dependent on mobility and 
trade. Continuous fighting over the past 20 years and its attendant consequences have 
continually undermined access to markets and migration, and denied households the 
opportunity to effectively address structural seasonal food deficits.47 
It is important to note that livelihoods are also shifting, as many households—
especially those of returnees—are settling in urban areas in South Sudan in the hope for 
more opportunity than in rural areas.48 While there are no overall statistical trends on 
urbanization in South Sudan, there is clear evidence that cities and towns are growing 
rapidly.49 Reasons for migrating to urban areas (especially the new capital city, Juba) 
include a combination of better economic and employment prospects owing to the 
presence of regional government, international organizations and private businesses;50 
perceptions of better access to health and social services; the location of SPLA 
headquarters in Juba, attracting soldiers and their families;51 having relatives in town; 
drought in rural areas; and insecurity owing to Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attacks 
and cattle raiding in the southernmost regions of South Sudan.52 The literature provides 
limited evidence of specific examples of successful livelihood recovery, and few insights 
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into the processes that have helped bring this about.  However, in general, analysts agree 
that livelihood recovery in South Sudan has been especially rapid in areas that have been 
least affected by conflict and where populations have gained greater access to arable land, 
infrastructure and services.53 Livelihood recovery has also been rapid for IDPs who 
return home with skills and are able to access land. Some specific conditions for and 
trends of livelihood recovery include the following. 
5. Protection Defined 
In addition, people’s rights are protected in conflict and post-conflict zones by a 
variety of international and national laws, including international humanitarian law 
(IHL), international human rights law, refugee law and national legislation.54 According 
to an ICRC report, the most commonly accepted definition of protection is, “all activities 
aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the 
letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law.”55 Susanne Jaspars states that protection is 
related to seeking assurance for the safety of civilians from acute harm, while also being 
concerned with preventing or mitigating the most damaging effects of violence on a 
civilian population.56 Protection is an essential element to encourage the return of 
refugees and IDPs back to Sudan. Furthermore, protection helps to establish stability and 
the confidence for the population to resume to life as it was before the interruption of 
conflict.  
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F. CONCLUSION  
The need for a broad method to the reintegration approach requires a re-
constructing about the external factors affecting the possibility for durable and 
sustainable strategies, as well as the focus on the immediate surface needs of the 
returnees. The aid and food rations received by humanitarian agencies are often the 
principal source of initial livelihoods for returnees, perhaps the only for some. 
Furthermore, it has been noted that the supply of relief can create a dependency 
condition, further stunting the economic growth of local communities. The continuous 
lack of peace and security in South Sudan has made life particularly harsh for those who 
are either living as internally displaced persons or as refugees. Refugee experience and 
livelihoods are key factors affecting their access to basic services and land for cultivation 
and establishing homesteads upon return. This thesis argues that without returnees’ 
access to key livelihood opportunities, the reintegration of returning refugees might fail 
to the extent that it may jeopardize the South Sudan’s hard-won independence.  
This thesis is organized into an introduction and four chapters: Chapter II 
provides the context of conflict in the case study of South Sudan, from independence in 
1956 until independence on July 9, 2011, and introduces the refugee and internally 
displaced person crisis (IDP). Chapter III examines short and long-term returnee 
reintegration programs of this case study and analyzes the links to livelihood strategies. 
Chapter IV addresses opportunities for growth and possible livelihood prospects for 
returning refugees. Finally, Chapter V provides conclusions and recommendations from 
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II. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT OF REFUGEE CRISIS IN 
SOUTH SUDAN 
The case study of South Sudan provides a clear example of the challenges an 
emerging post-conflict society faces in confronting root causes of conflict to ensure a 
sustainable reintegration of returnees, and not revert to the cycle of decades of violence. 
Persistence of conflict and civil wars has remained modern Sudan’s defining 
characteristic. From the outside, the origins of strife may seem obvious given the ethnic 
and religious complexity of the predominantly Arab and religiously Muslim population 
living mostly in the north and the African animists and Christians mainly residing in the 
south. The protracted conflict is frequently presented as either the continuation of “an 
age-old confrontation between varying ‘cultures’ defined by blood lines (i.e. ‘Arabs’ vs. 
‘Africans’), or the consequence of an artificial division imposed by colonial powers.”57 
Internally, however, the country is much more complex—and, ethnic and religious 
differences alone do not explain the cause of conflict.  
According to a prominent historian of this region, Douglas Johnson, Sudan’s 
recurring civil wars have been a product of several historical factors, including: the 
pattern of governance, the introduction to a particular brand of militant Islam, inequalities 
in economic, educational and political development, and a nationalist movement among 
the northern elite. While all of these features are components and cause for hostility, not 
one single issue solely encapsulates it. While there are endless angles from which to 
explore the causes of this protracted conflict, the emphasis for the purposes of this paper 
will briefly focus on the following issues related to the conflict: geography and natural 
resources, ethnicity and religion, the historical context including the two civil wars, and 
finally, the independence of South Sudan. Highlighting these prominent elements in the 
Sudanese conflict will illustrate this young nation’s challenge in determining long-term 
sustainable approach to reintegration. 
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A. BRIEF HISTORY OF SOUTH SUDAN 
The Sudan, pre-2011, was a collection of small, independent kingdoms and 
principalities from its beginning when Egypt conquered and unified the northern portion 
of the country, while the British colonized the southern region.58 The South Sudan 
conflict erupted in the seventeenth century when kingdoms based along the Nile River 
fought against the people of inland Sudan.59 The Ottoman-Egyptian rule from 1820–
1898 invading forces extracted some two million slaves from the “land of the Blacks” 
while the Anglo-Egyptian era from 1899–1955 isolated and marginalized the 
southerners.60 The British viewed the south as a buffer that could preserve English values 
and beliefs, such as Christianity, and eventually be developed and segregated into a 
separate political entity or integrated into British East Africa.61 In the north, Egypt 
encouraged Islamic values and political control of the country. Consequently, as the 
overwhelming disproportionate economic and political power came to be centered in the 
north, the two regions’ cultural and religious identities became greatly divisive.62 Since 
the days of the Anglo-Egyptian ruling, Sudan had been officially divided into two areas: 
the north and the south and many divisions have surfaced from the legacies of 
colonialism in Sudan.   
In 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded an agreement providing the 
Sudanese self-government. The first civil war, also known as the “Anya-Nya” meaning 
the “snake venom,” formed the southern Sudanese military movement in order to fight 
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against being underrepresented and discriminated against.63 From 1955 to 1972, this 
violent civil war was centered on the Sudanese government and southern rebels who 
demanded greater sovereignty for southern Sudan. Southerners were outraged by their 
exclusion from the bureaucracy and the security sector and the increasingly racial, the 
religious persecution by state institutions, and the developing disparity in economic 
development.64 As the government in the north refused to acknowledge the lack of 
southern political and economic power, the war intensified and over half a million 
southerners fled as refugees.65  
The southerners were wary of increased marginalization by the north, on the basis 
of the “Sudanisation” process, which was seen as favoring the better-educated 
northerners over the peripheral populations.66 The war was further fuelled by the 
“Islamization” policies of subsequent post-independence governments. According to one 
expert, Matthew LeRiche, this fighting resulted in an estimated 500,000 casualties, 
180,000 refugees and up to one million internally displaced civilians.67 The war ended 
with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted significant regional autonomy to 
southern Sudan on internal issues.68 However, many southerners felt that this peace 
agreement was weak and unclear and that Khartoum did not adequately adhere to the 
provisions. 
The Addis Ababa agreement that ended the first civil war failed to completely 
dispel the tensions that had originally caused it, particularly in view of the south, and 
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when Shari’a, or Islamic law, was introduced, the north-south conflict was reignited.69 
The second civil war, fought between the central Sudanese government and the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), began in May 1983 with the collapse of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement.  Matthew LeRiche et al described that the “resumption of war fed off 
historic southern resentments over the continuous underdevelopment, political 
marginalization and religious discrimination,” which were the main drivers of the first 
civil war.70    
The northern desire to control southern resources also significantly increased the 
tensions of the second civil war, which has continuously been a source of conflict and 
animosity. Many analysts agree that the expansion of oil wealth greatly contributed to the 
second phase of Sudan’s civil wars, and that the sharing of oil revenue was a key 
component of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). These two periods of 
civil war brought great suffering particularly to the population in the discriminated south 
where an estimated 1.5 million people have perished.71 The United States Committee for 
Refugees (USCR) reports put that figure that as many as 1.9 million people have died 
since 1983 due to conflict in Sudan.72  
B. INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH SUDAN 
In the signing of the CPA, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army/Movement 
(SPLA/M) had “come closer to achieving the goals of self-determination, Southern 
autonomy, independence or radical national transformation.”73 The CPA offered 
guarantees to secure the people of southern Sudan with an option for succession within 
six years. Additionally, this peace agreement established a new Government of National 
Unity in the north and an interim Government of South Sudan (GoSS). This agreement 
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included a permanent ceasefire and accord on wealth and power sharing. Furthermore, it 
called for a six-year interim period, during which the National Congress Party (NCP) and 
the southern-based SPLM share control of a Government of National Unity (GoNU) and 
at the end of which southerners have the right to vote on whether to remain part of a 
united Sudan or secede.74 Concluding a set date of 2009 for democratic elections, the 
CPA was followed by a referendum on self-determination for South Sudan. Elections 
were eventually held in April 2010 and the referendum in January 2011, when the 
majority of the people voted in favor of independence.75 Millions of Southern Sudanese 
exercised their hard-won right to self-determination by voting for ‘separation’ in a 
historic referendum to secede from Sudan. On July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan 
(RoSS) officially declared independence; almost all who voted were in support of 
seceding from Sudan.   
South Sudan’s declaration of independence in July 2011 marked the end of the 
peace agreement, and subsequently, the SPLA became the new country’s army. Ideally, 
allowing South Sudan to become a newly independent nation would have eased tensions 
between the deeply divided regions. However, several dynamics continue to underpin the 
years of civil war, most principally disputes over religion, resources, governance and 
self-determination.76 In addition, unresolved border disputes and tension over natural 
resources in the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states has resulted in a spiral of violence 
that has sent hundreds of thousands of Sudanese into neighboring countries as refugees.77  
As Matthew LeRiche describes, “South Sudan, previously referred to as Southern 
Sudan, is less a result of a deliberate process of asserting the differences between 
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northern and southern peoples, and more the result of a twentieth-century struggle over 
power, framed by the various geopolitical forces that defined the time.”78 As the newest 
nation in the world, the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) is undertaking the immense and 
challenging task of building a nation state. This task is difficult in and of itself, but RoSS 
also faces the “challenge of millions of displaced people, internal and external conflict, 
widespread food insecurity, a stagnant economy, and a population that includes dozens of 
tribes, ethnicities, indigenous communities and identities,” as Sarnata Reynold 
describes.79   
C. POST-INDEPENDENCE CHALLENGES 
South Sudan remains fragile in the interim period between post-war and the pre-
stabilization phase that it currently straddles. Especially in this interim period, experts 
suggest that stabilization efforts must seek the balance of adequate security and necessary 
development.80 In order to achieve this balance, the driving forces behind the war need to 
be determined and analyzed so as to not revert back to the same cycles of violence. Chei 
Mareng echoes this point in his statement, “In many cases [of post-conflict societies], 
reversions occur because the conditions are not ripe in the immediate fragile post-war 
environment…”81 The main post-independence challenges that South Sudan confronts 
have also been causes of war between the now divided Sudan. This section expands on 
two dominant drivers of the war, including: ethnic and religious tensions, and natural 
resources. Additionally, these components are integral to establish sustainable conditions 
for the return of refugees and IDPs and enhances the ability of the population to resume 
to life as it was before the conflict.  
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1. Ethnic and Religious Tension  
This subcategory seeks to understand the ethnic and religious differences that 
pose a constant threat to peace and stability in South Sudan. Chuei Mareng, suggests, 
“There is a sense that all conflicts in the country [former Sudan] have a political basis in 
which also has been acquired an ethnic dimension, with civilians being deliberately 
targeted on their basis of ethnicity.”82 The disorder of political structures relating to 
ethnic groups has been a significant contributor to the power struggle among the 
Sudanese communities.83 Sudan has two distinct cultures, the Arab and Black-African, 
with hundreds of tribal divisions and language groups, which make effective 
collaboration among them a major problem.84  
The historical process that has separated the Arab Muslim north and the African 
south have its roots in the Arabization and the Islamization of the north in the resistance 
to those forces in the south.85 The assimilation processes have favored the Arab religion 
and culture over the African race, religions, and cultures, which remained prevalent in the 
south.86 Sudanese contact and interaction with the Middle East via Egypt date back 
thousands of years, taking the form of trade in ivory, gold, and other commodities. Arab 
traders settled among the indigenous population and integrated themselves; they had the 
advantage of wealth, with which the Sudanese wanted to associate, and eventually the 
Sudanese identified with the Arabs. The process intensified after the advent of Islam in 
the seventh and ninth centuries, and concluded with peace accords with the northern 
peoples of Nubia and Beja. These accords established remote Arab control over the 
country, opened the channels of communication with the Arab world, guaranteed 
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freedom of movement for the Arabs, protected Arab trade. In addition, they safeguarded 
Arab settlement, but otherwise left the Sudanese in relative peace, autonomy, and 
independence. Robert Collins argued that the “central issue” for the Sudanese was their 
“quest for identity whereby African indigenous cultures could peacefully co-exist with an 
imported Arab culture in a Sudan dominated by neither.”87 
Arab migration and settlement in the south, in contrast to the north, were 
discouraged both by natural barriers, and by the difficult living conditions. The few Arab 
adventurers who engaged in slave raids were not interested in Arabizing and Islamizing 
the southerners, as that would have taken their prey from the land of war, and placed 
them in the category of land of Islam, thereby protecting them from slavery. The 
relationship between religion and the state, in particular the role of shari’a, or Islamic 
Law, which broadly imposes the upright path for the Muslim community in public and 
private affairs. Such religious and race relations have been intertwined, since Islam in the 
Sudan has been closely connected with Arabism as a racial, ethnic, and cultural 
phenomenon. The spread of Islam eventually changed the nature of Sudanese society and 
facilitated the division of the country into north and south.88 Islam also fostered political 
unity, economic growth, and educational development among its own adherents; 
however, these benefits were restricted largely to urban and commercial centers.  
Inter- and intra-tribal tensions leading to violence and conflict have been 
compounded by the diversity of ethnic and linguistic groups. The population of the 
former Sudan, pre-2011, totaled over 25 million people divided among approximately 19 
major ethnic groups and 597 sub-groups.89 While Arabic was the official language and 
mother tongue of the majority of the Sudanese; English was the language most used by 
the educated population in the South.90 Additionally of note, Sudanese citizens speak 
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more than a hundred other languages, many of which divide further into several dialects. 
Further dividing complicated ethnic and religious divides has been the differing standards 
of living and varying levels of economic, social, and cultural development further 
characterize the north and south, increasing the potential for tension and conflict. Islam, 
primarily prevalent in the north, due primarily to its geographical location of residing 
closer to Egypt and the Persian Gulf, and thus had centuries of contact with Arab nomads 
and traders, while British influence in the south prevented Islam from gaining converts 
there. The non-Arab tribes retained a mix of traditional religions and some converts to 
Christianity in the south.91   
South Sudan has been a country torn apart by the very factors that have woven it a 
microcosm of Africa and a strategic bridge between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle 
East. A result of the development is a polarization that has complicated the process of 
creating a national identity. This crisis has in turn led groups, factions and parties to 
adopt extreme positions, which are now represented by Islamic fundamentalism in the 
north and a rejectionist counterforce in the south, while the Islamists have dominated the 
government since it came to power.92 As Francis Deng argues that the issue of religion 
and its implications for the distribution of power and national wealth has continually 
remained one the most serious obstacles to the resolution of the conflict.93  
Many authors agree that what southerners resist and resent is not so much 
assimilation into the Arab-Islamic mold as it is the domination associated with its 
imposition. This resistance has proved to be the most formidable barrier to establishing 
an Islamic state in the Sudan.94 Advocates of shari’a argue that the non-Muslim minority 
should accommodate themselves to the will of the Muslim majority. Francis Deng argues, 
“Northern Sudanese, seeing Arabism and Islam as historic symbols of elevation to a 
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higher order of existence, whether racially, ethnically, or spiritually, see a more 
Africanized secular Sudan not only as a threat of demotion, but indeed an insult by a 
presumptuous, but not harmless aspirant.”95 The former Sudan has been known for its 
varied and complicated historical cultures, ethnicities, and religious groups. The varying 
ethnicity and religious groups represent one of the most controversial of all the forces 
driving conflict in Sudan. Islamists have consistently dominated the representation in 
government, primarily representing the north, resulting in a divergence between the 
interests of the government and the secular groups, further complicating north and south 
divisions.  
2. Natural Resources   
Before the division of the country in 2011, the Republic of Sudan was the largest 
country by area on the African continent. Sudan shared borders with nine countries, all of 
which have their own internal stability issues, including: Ethiopia, Egypt, Kenya, Chad, 
Central African Republic, Uganda, Libya, Eritrea, and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. The instability of the surrounding countries has contributed to their own 
challenge of fleeing displaced persons, and many sought refuge in South Sudan.  
The majority of Sudan’s natural resources, including: oil, water, fertile soil, and 
various minerals are found in the south. 96 Provided this, natural resources have been a 
central reason the north has strongly resisted southern separatism in dividing resource 
wealth. Water is also one of South Sudan’s greatest natural resources, relying on the Nile 
river system dominated by the Blue and White Nile rivers. Additionally, the discovery of 
oil in the south has been one of South Sudan’s richest resources, and also one of the most 
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Some experts estimated that oil reserved in Sudan are more than eight hundred million 
barrels, while other projections are as high as four billion barrels, making oil an evident 
cause for competition and violent disputes.97  
In one of their reports, the International Crisis Group (ICG) noted, “The 
expansion of oil development has complicated the search for peace, raised the stakes of 
war and given both sides an increased commitment to the battlefield.”98 Corruption and 
greed has become a pressing issue since the discovery of oil, as it proves to be one of the 
most main resources fueling the economy, furthering the cycle of tension and violence 
over wealth sharing and natural resources. According to a United Nations report from 
consolidating the organization’s agencies assistance work in South Sudan in 2012, the 
current economic outlook remained fragile as oil production immobilized 98 percent of 
the government’s revenue.99  
South Sudan’s abundance of natural resources provides a major advantage over 
many emerging post-conflict countries. In addition to South Sudan’s wealth of natural 
resources, land has also been a constant theme related to the cause of Sudan’s civil wars, 
and has continued to be an issue of largely unresolved strife. Northerners have driven 
local populations off productive agricultural land, which can primarily be found within 
the south, adding to the population of IDPs. Abundance of resources has also been its 
nemesis—people for slaves and land, water and forests for wealth accumulation and oil. 
The vast geographical landscape with a diverse mix of cultures, languages, religions, and 
ethnicities, combined with competition for resources, has directly affected regional 
unpredictability and has posed significant challenges towards achieving anything even 
remotely resembling peace and security as a modern nation-state.100 
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While South Sudan has an abundance of natural resources and arable land, 
providing means for economic gain, it has also been a cause for the cycle of violence 
before and since the separation of the former Sudan. Cynthia Arnson argues,  
…the income from natural resource commodities such as diamonds and oil 
[have] appeared to play a unique role not only in financing ongoing and 
ever-higher levels of violence by rebel and state forces but also in 
redefining the very purposes of struggle.101  
Arnson further argues that often such economic resources have been a central 
component sustaining civil wars, as especially seen in Africa. David Keen warned that 
conflict resolution strategies need to address the ways in which “contending forces” often 
have more to gain from a “continuation of conflict than from peace,” providing a deeper 
element than just simply winning a civil war.102 Furthermore, Paul Collier, a prominent 
economist argues, “…natural resource endowments, population size, and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, were powerfully linked to the risk of civil war.”103 Thus, the 
connection of resource wealth, and the pursuit of economic gains prove to be a key 
motivation for civil war. Other experts in the field of the political economy of war 
suggest that more economic opportunities through job creation will reduce conflict, as 
insurgent groups are less likely to engage in violence if provided other opportunities.104   
The separation of Sudan and South Sudan quite evidently occurred due to 
continuous conflict and civil wars, as described above. The root causes of these wars are 
complex and involve many different aspects of Sudan’s diversity, including its fight over 
natural resources, and its history of colonialism which isolated the south, concentrated 
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political and economic gains in the north, and increased the tensions and perceived 
divisions of different religious and ethnic groups. Echoing this point, a report concludes, 
“Concentration of power in a small group of competing elites has note granted the 
majority of Sudanese broader economic and political rights [and] has only deepened the 
country’s considerable geographic, religious, cultural, and ethnic divides.”105 
While most authors agree that Muslim/non-Muslim and Arab/African divisions 
are not simply the answer to Sudan’s unrest, they do seem to agree that the root cause is 
unequal distribution of power between the dominant Muslim north, and the marginalized 
Christian south; Islamic fundamentalism is not the main source of tension and conflict in 
Sudan, nor is it the main reason for the division of the country. Martha Wenger, states:  
Arab vs. African, Muslim vs. non-Muslim—these ethnic and religious 
differences alone do not explain the tensions that underlie Sudan’s 
ongoing civil war. It is because these ethnic and religious cleavages often 
coincide with the divide between rich and poor, power and weak, that they 
become explosive.106  
D. RESULT OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN: REFUGEE 
AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSON CRISES 
As a result of Sudan’s protracted civil wars—due primarily to the division of 
power within its varied ethnic and religious groups and the fight over economic gains 
from natural resources—South Sudan lost many innocent lives in the brutal conflict and 
faces one of the world’s largest refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) crises in 
the world today. An estimated two million people have died as a result of the fighting 
over the past several decades, with victims primarily represented from the south.107 One 
report suggests, “Although the precise scale of death and destruction resulting from the 
civil war will never be known; it has been one of the deadliest conflicts since World War 
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II.”108 Half a million displaced have sought refuge in the neighboring countries, mainly 
in Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya, and roughly four million people 
have been displaced and driven from their communities, primarily to northern cities such 
as Khartoum.109 The displaced population in Khartoum has been primarily dispersed 
among four IDP camps, particularly in the most undeveloped areas of the city.110 Marc 
Vincent et al., argued that the displaced in Khartoum have been in an environment of 
chronic vulnerability due to the suppression from the northern-dominated government of 
the Sudan. They continually faced discrimination based on their ethnicity, religion, and 
geographic origin.111 
According to an Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) report from 
the latter part of 2010, 4.5 million people were internally displaced in the region of 
Darfur, the greater Khartoum area, South Kordofan, and the 10 states of South Sudan.112 
Additionally, there were unknown numbers of IDPs in other northern and eastern 
states.113 Many predict that at least hundreds, if not thousands, more exist but have not 
yet been documented—thus, these figures may be unreliable as there are many restricted 
access to areas where many IDPs live, such as in eastern Sudan, Abyei and parts of 
Darfur.114 In addition, determining an accurate number is difficult due to the ongoing 
population movements occurring daily. Since the beginning of South Sudan’s 
independence in 2011, reports suggest that approximately 330,000 southerners have been 
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displaced by violence within South Sudan alone.115 After living in harsh conditions in 
refugee or IDP camps with some 34,000 people in some cases, these displaced groups 
long to return home.116 Hundreds of thousands of former refugees and IDPs have been 
making the treacherous journey back to their homeland since the signing of the peace 
agreement, and particularly since independence. The logistical strains for return are 
enormous, as many returnees must travel for weeks through areas of armed conflict in 
neighboring countries, while also exhausted from dehydration and malnutrition.117 
Reports suggest that at least 20,000 returnees are in Upper Nile State of South Sudan, 
putting a substantial strain on the limited resources of the host communities.118 In 
addition, these returnees often lack the skills, experience and social networks needed to 
manage the challenges upon return.  
When South Sudan was created, citizens of that nation as well as members of the 
international community had much confidence that this would finally mark the end of 
decades of violence between northern and southern Sudan. The elation of independence 
has been accompanied by the challenges of building a new nation. Yet, the most 
vulnerable populations remain vulnerable with little to return to and with an environment 
of persistent violence. Without the resolution of the internal tension over religious, 
ethnic, and economic divides or the disputes over natural resources, there is little 
optimism for refugees to return to a peaceful homeland of Southern Sudan. These post-
independence challenges create difficult circumstances for the reintegration of returnees 
to South Sudan.  
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III. THE CHALLENGE OF REINTEGRATING RETURNEES TO 
SOUTH SUDAN 
This chapter will provide an overview of the challenges confronting returnee 
reintegration—using South Sudan as the case study—after being displaced by decades of 
protracted conflict. It is imperative to determine these challenges, as they have also been 
cause for protracted violence. Therefore, sustainable long-term solutions must focus on a 
holistic approach to effectively address the root causes of violence in order to ensure 
successful reintegration so as to not revert back to the same cycles of conflict. In addition 
to the logistical constraints in coordination of their return home, returnees confront many 
challenges upon arrival—especially related to possible stirring of ethnic differences and 
tensions, the lack of infrastructure this new nation posses, the strain over land rights and 
the drastic levels of food insecurity.  
South Sudan represents an emerging nation from Africa’s longest civil war. In the 
aftermath of its independence, millions who were refugees in neighboring countries and 
those who were internally displaced during the war have been reintegrating to their 
homeland. This strong sense of people returning home is often driven by a desire not only 
to rebuild their future but also to contribute to the building of a viable and peaceful South 
Sudan. Estimates from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) suggest that 
hundreds of thousands of returnees have increased since 2010, particularly in the months 
before and just after independence.119 International humanitarian organizations, such as 
the IOM, predict that hundreds of thousands more returnees will continue to flee back to 
South Sudan in the coming months and years. 
A. CHALLENGES OF REINTEGRATION TO SOUTH SUDAN 
The Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) has strongly encouraged southerners to 
return to South Sudan, particularly in the initial months following independence. There 
has seemed to be a rather limited provision, however, of the required practical means to 
                                                 




assist these returnees. In addition, the logistical constraints for return are numerous, from 
the lack of available barges to cross the border to provision constraints of assisting 
humanitarian organizations.120 Ultimately, the RoSS has had to heavily rely on the 
international humanitarian community for assistance to support returnees as they confront 
issues related to: short-term focused relief, social reintegration and reconciliation, 
security and protection, lack of infrastructure, land rights, and food insecurity.  
1. Challenges to Reintegration: International Response, Short-term 
Relief Focus 
Humanitarian aid organizations have been active in developing post-conflict 
nations for decades. South Sudan has relied on these agencies as key stakeholders 
providing emergency aid during conflict and now in the transition since independence. 
According to a United Nations report from 2012, 30 separate relief operations have been 
underway in 59 of the nation’s 71 counties.121 Considering the countless organizations 
involved in assisting South Sudan, and the ever increasing number of organizations, this 
section will highlight the aid strategies of four prominent agencies that have both direct 
and residual impacts on reintegration, including: the Norwegian Refugee Council, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The World Food Program 
(WFP), and the International Office of Migration (IOM).  To date, there is an evident gap 
in the available literature on specific data outcomes from these organizations’ current 
strategies; therefore, this section summarizes their reported efforts.   
As a prominent humanitarian and emergency relief organization, the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC) has been operating in South Sudan since 2004, just before the 
signing of the CPA.122 They seek to provide assistance to IDPs, returnees, refugees and 
host communities, particularly in areas of most return. Their 2010 report concludes that 
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their efforts have been focused on emergency relief. Echoing this point, their 2010 report 
states, “Planning for the longer term response, especially considering South Sudan’s high 
susceptibility to shocks and the potential for protracted conflict with the north and 
internal conflict within Southern Sudan, has been limited.”123 According to another 
Norwegian Refugee Council report, through its Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 
the international response to South Sudan’s emerging crises has further been limited by 
the country’s insecurity.124 They note, “Many areas affected by displacement remain 
difficult to access, preventing vulnerable groups from obtaining urgently-needed 
assistance and making its delivery extremely expensive.”125 Therefore, improving 
infrastructure access is a key priority for humanitarian agencies. 
In addition, the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is one 
of the key players in South Sudan’s reintegration process and has been entrusted with the 
responsibility of organizing return and reintegration operations, despite that assistance for 
returnees upon arrival to their homeland goes beyond their core mandate.126 Since 2005, 
UNHCR has facilitated the return of more than 334,000 refugees from exile in Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.127 According to a recent report, they have been focused on 
the protection of returnees and supporting the reintegration of returnees in areas of high 
return.128 For instance, the agency provides returnees with a return package providing 
food rations for a limited time, typically for three months, and non-food items such as 
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seeds and domestic tools in the hopes that returnees will soon take up their own ways of 
living.129 In addition, a report assessing UNHCR’s reintegration processes states that the 
agency’s focus in South Sudan has also been on community based reintegration programs 
(CBRPs) with the assistance in construction of schools, medical facilities and community 
boreholes, as well as sanitation.130  
The World Food Program (WFP) has been another long-standing relief 
organization with a presence in South Sudan for many decades. Until the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the main objectives were primarily to 
save lives and provide a nutritional status.131 As a leading organization in food 
distribution, the WFP has been a central organization to provide returnees with food relief 
packages. Reported in late 2012, the World Food Program has distributed food packages 
to some 123,000 conflict-affected people in the state of South Kordofan alone.132 The 
2008 guidelines for WFP support to returnees state that all returnees should have access 
to food assistance during their return and reintegration and that, “… support to returnees 
should be considered fundamental to and consistent with a peaceful political 
transition.”133 The same report suggests that returnees may need support for the first 
several years as they develop self-sufficient livelihood opportunities.134   
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Another prominent relief agency involved in assisting South Sudanese refugees is 
the International Office of Migration (IOM). Their reintegration strategy for the current 
year aims to assist returnees by primarily improving access to basic and social services 
through the construction roads and economic opportunities through vocational training 
and infrastructure projects.135 According to a current report, IOM is currently responding 
to the needs of about 223,000 refugees registered across South Sudan.136 This report 
suggests that their recent focus has been to increase water supply while also promoting 
sanitation and hygiene.137 In addition, they have played a key role in relocating up to 
almost 20,000 refugees since 2011.138 While the IOM is especially recognized for their 
efforts in improving the living conditions of refugee camps and assisting returnees across 
the border to their homeland, they are also supporting ex-combatants in acquiring 
vocation skills such as sewing.139  
In general, plans to facilitate long-term reintegration of returnees have not been 
reliable and, in fact, many international organizations fear that the plan for the return of 
hundreds of thousands of people tends to place much emphasis on the short-term 
resolution approach (i.e., only addresses emergent needs while lacking a long-term goal 
for the returnees to take ownership and decrease the reliance on aid). According to a 
Refugees International field report, this is due in part to shortages in food reserves and in 
addition to a result of an attempt by humanitarian agencies to reduce what some have 
characterized as South Sudan’s “chronic hyper-dependency on outside food.”140 While 
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the provisions of basic needs upon returnees’ arrival are valuable in the immediate term, 
the longer-term development and sustainability for returnees is not adequately addressed. 
Sustainable solutions need to be considered in parallel of this initial phase of 
reintegration.     
Although the return of displaced persons are generally viewed as an encouraging 
sign of peace, it is important to note that returnees also present new challenges for the 
already scarce services, as seen in the case of South Sudan. In addition, the influx of a 
growing population increases the competition for scarce resources and increases the 
competition for economic self-sufficiency in an already limited employment opportunity 
situation.141 The coordination of resources and programs among multiple agencies and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can further challenge this transitional post-
conflict environment. In addition to temporary relief aid presenting a gap in durable 
solutions for sustainability, returnees’ also face adversity upon their return predominantly 
with respect to possible ethnic tension, lack of infrastructure, disputes over resource 
scarcity, and a disrupting and shifting source of livelihoods. These intricate elements 
have the potential to disturb the delicate contentions that have yet to be resolved and 
therefore can send communities back into violence. 
As described above, reintegration programs in this new post-conflict nation are 
dominated by short-term interventions. These short-term responses do not address the 
longstanding issues underlying vulnerability. The need, then, is to implement a long-term 
in order to confront the current emergency development-programming gap in South 
Sudan from short-term emergency relief to long-term sustainable reintegration.142  This 
research reveals that there are a few long-term reintegration programs that have begun to 
be implemented. While these organizations acknowledge the importance of securing 
livelihoods for returnees in their available reports, there remains limited expansion on 
                                                 
141 Daniel Maxwell, Kristen Gelsdorf, and Martina Santschi, “Livelihoods, Basic Services and Social 
Protection in South Sudan,” Feinstein International Center, July 1, 2012, 
http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7716.pdf. 
142 Luca Alinovi, Gunter Hemrich and Luca Russo, “Addressing Food Insecurity in Fragile States: 
Case Studies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Sudan, Rome: Agricultural and 
Development Economics Division,” Working Paper No. 7-21 (July 2007), Food and Agriculture 
Organization, ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ai028e/ai028e00.pdf 
 39 
these specific efforts or their outcomes as of yet.143 Evidently, their primary focus has 
been concentrated on the logistics of return and relief packages for the early stages of 
returnees’ reintegration.  
The return of displaced groups has far-reaching implications on the ability of the 
post-conflict nations, as seen in the case of South Sudan, to provide immediate access to 
basic services and provide longer-term solutions that ease the transition and create 
opportunities for self-sufficiency. The influx of returnees further strains the existing 
dynamic while also in parallel hinders the emergence of a revitalization effort leading to 
self-sufficiency and sustainability. The record of humanitarian assistance in South Sudan 
emphasizes that a range of strategic and agency partnerships are needed as the 
reintegration process evolves. Not one agency is able to provide all that South Sudan 
requires in relief or development methods. Various evaluations by these humanitarian 
organizations indicate that returnees face significant challenges upon their return to their 
homeland, including a lack of sustainable infrastructure and basic services, land right 
issues, food insecurity, as well as a lack of livelihood opportunities.  
2. Challenges to Reintegration: Social Reintegration and Reconciliation 
Another challenge facing post-conflict societies recovering from protracted 
conflict is the social reintegration of new and existing communities. The case of South 
Sudan provides evidence of this challenge in this particularly varied ethnic country. 
Perceived drastic differences between ethnic groups have been one of the root causes of 
recurrent violence—further emphasizing the inadequacy of immediate short-term 
solutions. The short-term emergency relief aid approach ignores the complicated 
dynamics of ethnic and religious divisions thereby further stunting sustainable 
stabilization in a post-conflict environment. Supporting this position, one humanitarian 
report reveals that about 170,000 additional displacements occurred between January and 
October 2012 in South Sudan due to persisting inter-communal violence, after 
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independence.144 This report further estimates that up to 200,000 new displacements will 
occur this year due to ongoing inter-, and intra-tribal tensions.  
The complexity of its population, and the diverse social and economic setting in 
which people live and are returning to, is of particular vulnerability of returning 
populations to South Sudan. Julie Brethfeld notes, “One of the main challenges facing 
returnees and IDPs has been their unfamiliarity with traditional practices in their [new] 
communities.”145 She further suggests that many feel alienated and are perceived as 
strangers, often resulting in community tensions. Especially in a post-conflict 
environment, the reintegration of returnees with existing residents poses a delicate 
challenge, as different ethnic groups must learn to live together, often for the very first 
time.146 Additionally, there is potential for political opposition between those who lived 
in government-controlled areas during the war, usually in the southern capital of Juba or 
in the northern capital of Khartoum, and those who lived in the SPLA-controlled 
areas.147 A sense of community and involvement, however, is essential for the long-term 
sustainable reintegration of returnees and for ensuring peace and security.  
3. Challenges to Reintegration: Security and Protection 
The effective and long-term oriented reintegration strategy of returnees to a war-
torn country is crucial for maintaining a viable and functioning security environment that 
enables stability to persist. Post-conflict returnee re-introductions are often complicated 
by a lack of basic socio-economic infrastructure and an absence of opportunities essential 
for returnees to address sustenance requirements beyond immediate needs. As seen in 
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South Sudan, these challenges can undermine delicate post-conflict peace and lead to a 
re-ignition of violence due to the complex relationship of competing interests, priorities, 
and needs. Evidence of protection and security in this fragile environment is 
fundamentally informed by the nature and character of the return and the reintegration of 
displaced populations. Additionally, many experts in peace and security studies argue 
that the successful and planned reintegration of returnees is essential to preventing war-
torn countries from relapsing into violence.148  
4. Challenges to Reintegration: Lack of Infrastructure 
Another considerable challenge facing the reintegration of returnees is the limited 
infrastructure found in most emerging post-conflict societies, such as in South Sudan. 
Primarily, South Sudan lacks essential road infrastructure. Inadequate transport 
infrastructure, for example, isolates about 60 percent of the country from gravel road 
access due to heavy rains, mine presence, and damage to bridges.149 Deficient and 
unreliable transport capacities further complicate humanitarian agencies’ access to 
provide assistance to remote areas. Additionally, it limits the population’s movement to 
markets, impeding on economic growth and opportunity. Since independence in 2011, the 
rehabilitation of basic services and infrastructure has not improved to expected levels.150 
Additionally, up to 15,000 returnees were stranded during their return to South Sudan in 
2012 largely due to the impassibility of roads.151 Up to 30,000 of the remaining 95,000 
South Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries as predicted to return home in the next 
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year, and will also be requiring transport to return.152 These obstacles also present more 
difficulties to food security and traditional livelihood sources—revealing that lack of 
infrastructure poses immense difficulties to all sectors. The emergent needs of temporary 
shelter, food, or medical services upon return need to be accompanied by activities aimed 
at longer-term social and economic recovery particularly in local infrastructure and 
agricultural development. 
5. Challenges to Reintegration: Land Rights   
Access to land is an additional challenge for social and economic reintegration for 
returnees, particularly after protracted conflict situations where land has been destroyed. 
The issue of land allocation has proven to be an additional challenge for the process of 
reintegration. The case of South Sudan highlights the central importance of land to a 
predominantly rural dwelling nation. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
mandated the establishment of the Southern Sudan Land Commission (SSLC) to address 
the concerns of land tenure and property rights.153 According to a USAID report, the 
customary system and traditional authorities are capable of dealing with indigenous 
returnees who seek to access their ancestral land.154 They are not, however, well 
equipped to deal with the influx of people who are not indigenous to their 
communities.155 As is often the case in conflict and post-conflict situations, uncertainty 
over land ownership presents a variety of challenges. For returnees, many of whom have 
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been living outside the area for years, and likely dwelling in urban areas where many of 
the camps were placed, it can be difficult to acquire the right kind of land.156 This is 
especially true where there are ethnic tensions among communities, as well as in urban 
areas such as the state capitals.  
Furthermore, access to land affects prospects for returnees’ recovery. Many agree 
that humanitarian agencies neglect the key role in the recovery and reintegration phase of 
post-conflict reconstruction as this important issue has direct impact on settlement 
patterns and thus on the future prospects of the people affected.157  In the case of South 
Sudan, land is one of the most valuable of rural people’s assets and forms the center of 
their livelihood strategy.158 In fact, the issue of land and land ownership in South Sudan 
was a significant factor behind the war between the GoS and the SPLA, and it continues 
to be a major driver of ongoing inter and intra-tribal conflicts. The land shortages in 
urban areas are especially limited, thus the growing population in urban areas does not 
provide viable opportunities in the long-term. The major factor that influence post-war 
livelihood in rural areas is people’s access to land for cultivation and for establishing 
homesteads. Alex De Waal argues that a humanitarian response has an impact on land 
tenure and settlement patterns both during and in the recovery phase.159 Consideration of 
land issues is in this regard an essential way of preserving and rehabilitating people’s 
livelihoods strategies. 
6. Challenges to Reintegration: Food Insecurity 
One of the main challenges returning refugees and IDPs confront on a daily basis 
is the prevalence of food insecurity. The comprehensive definition for food security was 
adopted at the World Food Summit in 1996: “Food security exists when all people, at all 
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times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”160 According to a 
report related to South Sudan’s annual needs and livelihoods assessment from 2008, 
some 4.1 million people were estimated to be at risk of food insecurity and about 10 
percent of the population, around one million, have been severely food insecure.161 
Moreover, it provides exposure to the structural factors leading to drastic food insecurity 
through South Sudan’s low agriculture production and productivity, limited 
infrastructure, and poor access to basic social services—all of which undermine their 
ability to adequately feed themselves.162  
Another report consolidating UN agency efforts in South Sudan suggests that 2.3 
million people will need food assistance as increasing numbers of returnees arrive, 
contributing to the high levels of food insecurity.163 It concludes that 2.1 million people 
received food assistance in 2012. Their estimates reveal that 3.85 million people in rural 
host communities are moderately to severely food insecure. In addition, it is predicted 
that some 750,000 returnees will require food assistance in the next year.164 Over 
300,000 returnees have been supported with farming inputs to re-enter agricultural 
production. However, this report notes, “…for the most part, this assistance is not 
accompanied by support to people’s livelihoods and their capacity to produce their own 
food.”165    
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B. CONCLUSION 
In addition to the monumental task of rebuilding a post-conflict society, long-term 
sustainable reconstruction strategies must concurrently focus on the reintegration of 
returnees. As described above, reintegration can also contribute to a spiral of decline 
through re-igniting tensions due to ethnic divisions, lack of infrastructure and 
opportunity, destroyed means of historical livelihoods, or the fight for limited resources 
land rights, and food insecurity. The case study of South Sudan concludes that these 
issues have been root causes for violent conflict throughout history of civil wars and 
cannot be addressed simply through short-term relief or strategies. Therefore, these 
fragile issues pose significant confrontations to the newly emerging nations, such as 
South Sudan, to avoid levels of forced displacement in the future. In this sense, it is not 
only a question of how to make reintegration sustainable, but how to make it sustainable 
on a community-wide basis, particularly for the re-development phase of the post-
independent South Sudan.  
This chapter on South Sudan has shown how existing unresolved socio-economic 
and political issues, such as limited resource sharing, ambiguous land rights, and ethnic 
and religious tensions, have tarnished the security environment. The result is continued 
violence and relative instability, as shown by continuing local level conflicts and 
population displacement in the new country. As one expert describes, “Many 
communities say that independence has only ended a certain kind of war, but has left 
sources of insecurity most relevant to them unmitigated...”166 Further complicating this 
fragile dynamic, destroyed and/or underdeveloped infrastructure has prevented access to 
goods and services thereby stunting productive economic development. As such, 
sustained peace is not a given in post-conflict South Sudan, nor can it be sustained by 
immediate relief aid; and social stability remains delicate. These challenges have been 
exacerbated by the influx of returnees and thus highlight the increased importance of a 
long-term holistic returnee reintegration focus that addresses possible threats to the 
stabilization process. As a report from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) reveals, 
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“…some villages have more than doubled in size since the arrival of the returnees, 
putting tremendous pressures on resources, food and shelter in particular.”167  
Viewed through this lens of the South Sudan case study, the scale of returnees and 
the consequent demands of resettlement, reintegration, and livelihood building pose many 
logistical, political and socio-economic challenges to the newly established governments, 
local communities and institutions, and the international agencies concerned. In many 
instances, the spatial movements of the returnees have been complex due to local and 
inter-communal conflicts. While some experts may generally consider the preferred 
solution to refugees’ plight to be repatriation, it is important to consider their return to a 
changed environment without adequate access to livelihood resources which could mean 
that returning may be as traumatizing as forced migration itself. Providing development 
assistance in such situations requires a different approach than the traditional emergency 
and relief based approach that was not designed to revise or support livelihoods for the 
long-term. Providing opportunity for returnees’ thus spurs economic growth and long-
term development. This will also ultimately reduce the likelihood of conflict reemergence 
and subsequently mitigate the potential risks of future displacement of people. 
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IV. LIVELIHOOD DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY: SOUTH 
SUDAN CASE STUDY 
As evidence from this research determines, long-term security and stability are 
closely linked to the large-scale livelihood planning for people affected by conflict. The 
capacity to overcome social and economic vulnerabilities means that the humanitarian 
community must make greater efforts to increase stabilization by enhancing security and 
protection through livelihood analysis and action. Sustainable peace for communities 
involved in conflicts as well as regional security depends on people having access to 
viable and self-sustaining opportunity for the long-term. This section will provide a brief 
example of what is currently being done to address long-term livelihood opportunities in 
the case of South Sudan, and will expand on South Sudan’s agricultural sector—perhaps 
the largest area of potential for growth for livelihood opportunities for this new nation.  
A. LIVELIHOOD DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN: CURRENT 
APPROACH  
Presently, many experts agree that government and agency support around 
livelihood reintegration in South Sudan has been gradual at best, revealing a gap in 
coordination among the stakeholders; at worst, this approach has been non-existent, 
lacking a broader integrated strategy to revive the rural economy.168 Interventions are 
dominated by the supply of seeds and tools for short-term aid and ‘relief’, and have yet to 
adequately integrate the complex mix of longer-term strategies for livelihood 
development. Inadequate recovery reflects weaknesses in coordination mechanisms 
between the various stakeholders.169 Given the limited capacity of the still fragile and 
developing government, international cooperation partners and NGOs have been heavily 
relied upon. Implementation of a livelihood management approach, however, has faced 
enormous challenges because the conflict has destroyed crucial components necessary for 
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sustainable development. Many humanitarian relief practitioners agree that “Coordination 
around return, reintegration and recovery needs to be strategic and rooted in in-depth 
analysis of the situation to guide planning, including the prioritization and sequencing of 
interventions…”170 They also recognize that there remains a great recovery and 
implementation gap. Although these organizations have been primarily focused on 
providing emergency assistance, the incorporation of a long-term development assistance 
focus is the crucial next step.  
One aid agency in particular has begun to focus projects on developing South 
Sudan’s agricultural sector, however. In 2010, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), in partnership with the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), 
inaugurated a $55 million program aimed specifically at helping farmers in South Sudan 
to develop their agricultural potential.171 This USAID five-year initiative, called the 
Food, Agribusiness, and Rural Markets (FARM) program has a focus on select counties 
in South Sudan’s ‘green belt zone’ spanning Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria 
states, and where conflict destroyed much of the local capacity for agricultural production 
during the civil wars.172 The USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah mentioned:  
USAID is proud to work with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry on 
this innovative and promising project. The FARM program marshals a 
variety of resources in a re-emerging agricultural area and will inspire 
others to join as partners in reducing hunger in South Sudan.  This is a 
solid high-impact use of U.S. support that will save lives and develop 
livelihoods.173    
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It has been recognized that this area has high agricultural potential and has been in 
the process of being connected through new road construction to fast-growing markets 
for farm goods.174 The program seeks to increase long-term farm productivity, trade, and 
the capacity of people engaged in the agricultural sector in South Sudan. The focus is 
primarily on commodities such as groundnuts, sorghum, rice, cassava, maize, sesame, 
tomatoes, cabbage, onion and okra.175 USAID’s FARM program provides a potential 
model for other humanitarian organizations to follow and help build on. USAID has felt 
confident in their assessment and implementation in this program with the GoSS that it 
will help empower vulnerable communities and assist in expanding its agricultural sector. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations has also 
begun to recognize and act on South Sudan’s immense agriculture sector potential. It has 
begun accumulating about $50 million to build an Interim Assistance Plan (IAP) that 
focuses on building capacity ministerial and state agricultural extension offices. This 
interim plan also includes, “…establishment of a seed and production sector and an urban 
and peri-urban agriculture component as many returnees arrive in the capital of Juba and 
other major towns in South Sudan will need to produce as much of their own food as 
possible.”176 FAO’s support includes training young farmers and building administrative 
capacity. The FAO’s donors represent worldwide support in this venture as they have 
received funding from Canada, France, Spain, and Switzerland.177 These beginning 
efforts support the argument for need towards a shifted focus from emergency relief aid 
to the crucial element of a long-term strategy containing a livelihood approach. As such, 
humanitarian agencies are establishing such programs in order to successfully revive and 
reconstruct a newly post-conflict nation. 
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B. LIVELIHOOD DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN: OPPORTUNITIES 
While the provision of sustainable assistance that supports development in post-
conflict situations is fraught with many challenges, opportunities often coexist in parallel. 
These opportunities, rooted in long-term strategies, are capable of improving the 
overarching security environment by easing resource strains. As previously discussed, 
protracted conflict often destroys or degrades the vast majority of the economic 
infrastructures necessary for self-sustaining growth and development.178 Former refugees 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs), largely poor and previously dependent upon 
agriculture for their living, find themselves returning to devastated local economies 
lacking foundational elements.179 The study of South Sudan determines that its historical 
agricultural roots have the potential, at its core, to serve both as an economic and security 
driver—while directly contributing to sustainable stabilization and reconstruction of the 
nation. An agriculturally oriented approach leverages existing skills and abilities and 
overcomes the potential issues associated with limited technical expertise and the 
learning curve needed to engage in non-agricultural activities. As Jules Pretty suggests, 
“…instead of having to rely on costly external inputs…the improvements are based on 
improved configurations and use of natural, social, and human capital assets.”180 Pretty 
further argues that these components are abundant in seemingly poverty stricken regions 
of Africa such as South Sudan. 
C. AGRICULTURE SECTOR IN SOUTH SUDAN: POTENTIAL FOR 
LONG-TERM GROWTH 
South Sudan provides an example of a post-conflict nation containing 
considerable untapped potential for long-term agricultural growth and a sustainable long-
term livelihood opportunity. Many agree that the country has abundant land with ideal 
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climatic and soil conditions suitable for crop production.181 The Ministry of Agriculture 
in South Sudan recognizes the significant potential for agriculture growth, according to 
its statement that “…there is a strong consensus in the Government of South Sudan 
(GoSS) that agriculture could be a vehicle for broad-based non-oil growth and economic 
diversification.”182 The agriculture sector is also featured as a high priority in South 
Sudan’s 2011–2013 development goals.183 Currently, it is estimated that 90 percent of 
land in South Sudan is arable,184 only four percent of which is actually cultivated.185 
Agriculture in South Sudan is primarily subsistent, consisting mainly of small-scale 
agriculture and livestock-raising.186 Subsistence agriculture accounts for about 80 
percent of employment in South Sudan.187 And approximately 53 percent of food 
consumed at household levels in South Sudan comes from their own production 
agriculture.188 Agriculture constitutes about one-third of the country’s gross domestic 
product (GDP), with potential for growth.189   
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Subsistence level agriculture is not South Sudan’s only option, however. Soil and 
climate conditions allow for a wide range of food and cash crops, with the latter posing a 
potential engine of economic growth and employment.190 Among the main crops 
produced are sorghum, maize, cassava and millet, produced in the rainy, fertile areas that 
include the Nuba Mountains and the area surrounding the regional capital of Juba.191 
Livestock products, including meat and milk, are the most important food sources for 
households in the arid southeastern region.192 Other crops grown include groundnuts, 
cassava, green grams, cowpeas, beans, sesame, and pumpkins.193 UNDP research has 
shown that crop production is mainly rain fed and relies almost exclusively on manual 
means of production with “rudimentary basic tools,” meaning that with irrigation, growth 
is possible in this sector.194 
While several NGOs and humanitarian agencies are aware of the opportunities 
presented by agriculture, few have been able to fully capitalize on its unrealized long-
term benefits.195 According to a World Bank (WB) report, experience has shown that 
GDP growth from agriculture has been twice as effective at reducing poverty compared 
to GDP growth originating from other sectors.196 “Greater agricultural production 
increases demand for related sectors, such as rural transformation and services: 
infrastructure, agro-business, trade and tourism, transport, and communication,” 
according to this World Bank report.  
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Provided that South Sudan relies primarily on such a specific sector for 
livelihoods, it is especially important to ensure protection and a peaceful environment in 
order to prevent reverting back to conflict and violence, greatly disrupting this delicate 
cycle once again. The capacity for development of its undeveloped agriculture sector 
provides significant implications for the prospects long-term sustainability through 
economic growth. Each of South Sudan’s agro-ecological zones, from its Greenbelt Zone 
to the Arid Zone, is capable of producing more subsistence needs.197 Reducing the cost 
of relying on food imports would also assist in profitable expansion. Furthermore, the 
agriculture sector is essential to increasing food security whereby producing long-term 
and self-sufficient provisions.   
1. Agriculture Growth: Contribution to Economic Gains 
 Several experts identify that while public revenue and government spending 
depend primarily on the oil industry in South Sudan, this provides very limited 
employment opportunities.198 They further conclude that household incomes and 
employment are generated primarily by crop production and livestock rearing, thus, 
growing the agriculture sector would provide more opportunities for the South Sudanese 
to sustain themselves.199 Additionally, the World Bank estimates that increasing 
cropland from the current four percent of total land area would greatly increase the per 
capita yields and would significantly increase the value of agricultural production.200 As 
a United Nations Development Program report on South Sudan states, “The agriculture 
sector has the potential to be an additional engine of growth to the oil sector that would 
allow the country to diversify its economy to achieve transformational development and 
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reduce poverty and food insecurity.”201 Expanding the agriculture sector in South Sudan 
would increase potential economic gains by diversifying growth opportunities, rather 
than relying on the oil industry for their primary fiscal means. Some experts note that 
revenues from known oil reserve levels and production plans in South Sudan could dry 
up in 20 to 30 years.202 Considering this, it is imperative for the long-term viability of 
South Sudan to vary economic opportunities and not solely rely on the oil industry for 
profit growth.    
2. Agriculture Growth: Potential for Restoring Community 
Agriculture also provides an avenue for restoring communities through working 
together to rebuild their neighborhoods and reviving the nation’s economy, particularly 
important for emerging post-conflict societies. This level of social reintegration is an 
important element to connecting communities, re-connecting returnees with residents, 
and providing ownership in their long-term integration and recovery towards stabilization 
and reconstruction. While culturally most of the returnees share the same heritage as 
residents,203 the agriculture sector creates opportunity for reunification and strengthened 
social aspects of the community.   
3. Agriculture Sector: Immediate Challenges 
Of note, agricultural production in the case of South Sudan is deficient and the 
current environment presents few market opportunities for sustainable and long-term 
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livelihoods.204 Poor roads and infrastructure present added restriction for access markets, 
which limits the potential for agriculture to contribute to economic growth.205 Thus, in 
order for South Sudan to achieve its agricultural production potential, it is crucial that the 
government invests in improving road and infrastructure between production and 
consumption areas. Experts agree that improved access to markets would yield economic 
gains for farmers, allowing them to increase their opportunity to compete with food 
imports in the short run, and would also assist in providing a platform to conquer cross-
border markets in the medium to long-term.206 
Another challenge that South Sudan faces in expanding its agricultural potential 
pertains to land rights to ensure access. According to experts within South Sudan’s 
Ministry of Agriculture, a revised Land Act has been in process and is being prepared to 
create an appropriate policy environment for peace, successful conflict resolution, and 
private investment especially in agriculture.207 Especially important is that this new 
policy addresses access to land for returnees, which would lessen the pressure for 
conflict, and would also expand rural growth.   
In addition, the GoSS acknowledges that the lack of skilled human resources has 
been a considerable factor in low capacity as the country transitions from dependence on 
foreign aid to development support.208 A key strategy will be to strengthen training 
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programs and on-the-job training. Considering the transition from a war-torn country, it 
will take considerable time to be trained and it will be difficult for local farmers to 
initially produce at a standard to compete and trade with surrounding regional markets.  
However, laying the foundation of subsistence farming could eventually provide 
greater economic gains as they build this sector into the commercial agriculture capacity 
for the long-term. Agricultural production may require more of a robust rural economy 
before it can create and sustain the opportunities necessary for livelihood security, let 
alone commercial agriculture. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Food 
Programme (WFP) in 2006, point out a few limitations for improved crop production and 
concluded that pests and crop diseases, along with the shortage of seeds, were among the 
main hindrances in agricultural growth in South Sudan.209 Innovation through adopting 
new technologies is needed in order to move beyond the traditional techniques used at 
present towards higher productivity farming.210 Eventually, policies and programs 
around the development of market infrastructure can advance the proper technologies and 
skills to enhance the agricultural production in South Sudan, and launch the longer-term 
foundations of recovery. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
A long-term reintegration strategy for post-conflict nations must take into account 
the resources that are available at hand to ensure sustainability, rather than strictly relying 
on outside aid. It is imperative to incorporate, and bring to surface, elements that the 
nation already bestows to ensure sustainability in its reconstruction efforts. The study of 
South Sudan concludes that the agricultural sector affords the most opportunities to be 
incorporated in a long-term strategy for the successful reintegration of returnees. 
Agriculture not only presents sustainable livelihood options, but it also has the potential 
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to increase economic growth, improve food security and self-sufficiency and create an 
environment whereby encouraging and fostering community reintegration and ownership 
in the development process of this fragile new nation. Therefore, developing a long-term 
reintegration strategy including a livelihood component directly confronts the root causes 
for war to begin with. Rather than temporarily burying these issues through the guise of 
temporary relief aid, this long-term approach establishes community participation and 
sustainable stability.      
Unstructured and unguided resettlement presents additional complications to an 
already tenuous security environment by placing additional strains on the resource-
restricted environment. Should the security and protection situation deteriorate, this will 
affect the return and reintegration of returnees and cause further displacement.211 The 
potentially destabilizing effects of the return of displaced populations highlight the 
central importance of proactive and effective management of reintegration to post-
conflict recovery, which is of particular importance for newly independent South Sudan. 
Echoing this position, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UN OCHA) declared:  
Internal displacement cannot truly be said to be resolved until the people 
affected have secured a source of livelihood. Without it, they may be 
forced to move again in order to survive. In the aftermath of conflict that 
has caused displacement, particularly if the conflict has been protracted, 
people who are returning or settling in new communities find themselves 
thrust from one artificial economy into another. The displaced persons’ 
plight is not resolved until the transition has been made into a normal 
economy of productive assets. Only then can a development process get 
under way.212   
Highlighting the importance of establishing a long-term reintegration—
livelihood—strategy, the United Nations and Partners Work Plan of 2013, “Improved 
access to sustainable livelihoods is key to reducing reliance on aid, increasing self-
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sufficiency and supporting durable solutions to displacement.”213 While traditionally 
reintegration of returnees has largely relied on the provision of relief aid from various 
humanitarian organizations, the transition from this immediate relief to longer-term 
development must be cultivated. Furthermore, Richard Black states that by far the most 
serious challenge for return and sustainable reintegration is the limited possibilities for 
establishing sustainable livelihoods, as livelihood options are generally more limited in 
post-conflict economies than they otherwise would be.214 Livelihood revitalization, 
therefore, is essential for the achievement and implementation of a viable long-term 
development process that reduces the likelihood of conflict and strife while. 
Many experts agree that developing the agriculture sector is pivotal for peace and 
security and also that, “…sustained stabilization of the new nation will be support for the 
successful social and economic reintegration of the large numbers of returnees in the 
agriculture sector.”215 Further developing and advancing South Sudan’s agriculture 
sector will also decrease its reliance on foreign aid. Moreover, it will provide the 
government its citizen’s the capacity to rebuild their nation together. Thus, advancing and 
expanding South Sudan’s largely untapped agricultural sector directly addresses all of the 
challenges discussed throughout this paper. While it is recognized that rebuilding this 
sector will take several years and significant dedication from the government and 
agencies involved, the investment into South Sudan’s sustainable future will be worth the 
wait. Provided its abundance of natural resources, South Sudan has an advantage over 
other developing nations and the fruit of this potential must be more sufficiently utilized.  
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V. CONCLUSION: EFFECTS OF A LONG-TERM 
REINTRGARTION LIVELIHOOD STRATEGY 
In conclusion, it is imperative to obtain a long-term reintegration strategy—with a 
livelihood component—for emerging post-conflict environments to achieve sustainable 
stabilization and reconstruction. This approach requires a different strategy than the 
traditional emergency relief focus that has not been designed to rebuild or support 
livelihoods from the perspectives of returnees. The latter approach has the potential to 
contribute to the creation of attitudes of powerlessness and dependency, the main 
ingredients for vulnerability, rather than providing protection and security to promote 
peace and security by assisting to create self-reliance through livelihoods production. 
Additionally, without sustainable access and opportunities for livelihood production 
within the local sector, such as in agriculture for example, the reintegration of returning 
refugees may lead to increased levels of instability and disruption. There are a number of 
ways in which livelihoods activities contribute to enhancements of a sustainable 
environment, by “...reducing exposure to threats or the need to engage in risky strategies, 
addressing the humanitarian consequences of exposure to threats, promoting access to 
markets and land and ensuring that livelihoods activities do not put conflict-affected 
people at additional risk.”216 Essentially, incorporation of livelihood considerations can 
create an economic and social equilibrium.    
The processes facilitating the return of the displaced, accompanying aid packages 
for returnees, and initial provision of basic services are components of the initial phase of 
stabilization for returnees. In parallel with this initial effort, the focus must be on the 
long-term processes to assist sustainable reintegration and stabilization. Agencies focused 
on assisting returnees, such as UN organizations, are in an optimal position to assume a 
higher profile in advocating for greater awareness and an improved response from the 
GoSS and the international community to meet the long-term needs of the returnees 
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through livelihood improvements.217 In addition to providing the capacity and 
implementation for long-term approaches through promotion of sustainable livelihoods, it 
is essential for assisting agencies to understand the intricacies related to the skills of the 
returnees and the environment in which they are returning to. Understanding the 
underlying risks at large, particularly in relation to potential sources of conflict, is 
imperative to meet local community needs and maintain an environment of peace and 
stability. To achieve this, external intervention must ideally be aimed at primarily 
advancing livelihood-focused economic development.  
The study of South Sudan analyzed evidence of an emerging post-conflict nation 
struggling to transition from the pattern of short-term emergency aid to long-term 
sustainability. Despite the euphoria, sense of freedom, and the high hopes that came with 
independence, the people of this young nation continue to confront challenges associated 
with the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In light of the 
existing socio-economic deficiencies that have emerged from years of conflict and unrest, 
changes in the human landscape and demographics have, in part, fueled unresolved ethnic 
tensions, contributed to economic stagnation, and undermined development efforts. 
Ultimately, this changing dynamic contributes to a cycle of insecurity for returnees and 
existing residents alike. Not only does this resulting instability create limited immediate 
opportunities for returnees, it has long-term implications on the ability of South Sudan to 
emerge from its stage of post-conflict development and adopt a sustainable growth 
pattern towards stabilization and reconstruction. 
A. SETBACKS: CHALLENGE OF REINTEGRATION AND 
INADEQUACIES OF SHORT-TERM STRATEGY 
The process of effectively reintegrating returnees is a daunting undertaking for a 
post-conflict nation with underdeveloped/underutilized resources, infrastructure, and 
governance capabilities. It is further complicated by the inherited challenges of protracted 
conflict. Several experts express this position by noting:  
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Not only is it difficult for refugees and other migrants as individuals to 
simply go ‘home,’ but also return to countries of origin can contribute to a 
spiral of decline, whether through re-igniting conflict, through 
perpetuating inequality or abuses of rights or through economic hardship, 
which could stimulate greater levels of forced displacement in the 
future.218 
The perpetuation of inequity and the potential re-ignition of conflict pose an 
immense challenge to emerging post-conflict nations and its individual inhabitants, as 
described in the case of South Sudan. The central issue is how the return of the displaced 
can be managed to overcome the spiral of decline outlined above. Specifically, 
reintegration must largely be prepared to address economic hardship and other factors 
that could lead to further destabilizing forced displacement, violence, and 
underdevelopment. 
Consequently, support of the reintegration process demands a two-fold approach. 
Immediate humanitarian needs must be supplemented by a sustainable long-term 
strategy. The case study of South Sudan showed that while the international community 
and the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) have paid particular focus on the provision 
of aid to address imminent humanitarian needs, a longer-term strategy has not fully been 
developed yet (though the beginnings are there). As a result, South Sudanese continue to 
experience instability and violence in their daily lives.  
Experts in the field of reintegration in post-conflict societies recognize that 
“Reintegration is of necessity a gradual process; given the destruction of infrastructure 
and social capital in the south [Juba], it is impracticable to expect that all requirements 
for return will be met evenly and on time.”219 Many stakeholders have been striving 
towards supporting mitigation of the conflict, and the provision of emergent aid.  
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According to a report by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, however, 
food shortages continue even in regions in which assistance has been provided by 
international agencies.220  
While the immediate needs of returnees have been the focal point of many 
humanitarian organizations, mainly in the form of relief aid package of food rations, there 
remains a gap in the assistance to establish longer-term sustainable opportunities. The 
question remains whether the current process is proceeding in a manner that will provide 
returnees the best chance of future success. This, however, is not to say that no efforts 
have been made toward enhancing the future self-sufficiency and viability of post-
conflict societies; rather it highlights the central importance of a long-term strategy for 
returnee management processes.  
In addition, the study of South Sudan shows that security and protection 
conditions in post-conflict societies cannot be addressed through short-term relief 
strategies. This study also showed that because the refugees and IDPs returned without 
sufficient planning or support, their return has contributed to greater levels of instability. 
As part of a comprehensive and long-term repatriation strategy, this case emphasized the 
need to confront historical conditions and root causes leading to violent conflict. Pre-
existing conditions of insecurity led to the inadequate protection or opportunity for the 
exceptionally vulnerable returnees, who then contributed to a decline in security. In 
essence, resource strains were amplified by the increase of a population that had limited 
ability to provide for itself or contribute to community and national development.  
In light of this backdrop, it is evident that these components combined directly 
contribute to the unstable situation that continues to haunt this fragile new nation. 
Ultimately, an atmosphere of insecurity risks further destabilization and raises the 
possibility that the cycle of violence may reemerge. Prospects for advancing development 
in South Sudan rely on achieving stability and security. Devoid of longer-term 
resolutions resulting in sustainable opportunities, security—a central element to the 
progression of post-conflict society (e.g. South Sudan) development—remains weak. 
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However, this research concludes that a long-term strategy containing a livelihood 
component directly confronts the security and protection dilemma in post-conflict 
societies. This long-term strategy establishes stability whereby fostering community and 
providing economic opportunities and sustainable growth.  
B. LOOKING AHEAD: OPPORTUNITIES FOR LONG-TERM 
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 
This research concludes that returnee management is strengthened by the 
incorporation of a broader community-based approach that establishes an environment 
that brings together the needs of residents and returnees under a joint recovery and 
sustainment framework. As discussed in previous chapters, the South Sudan case study 
supports the argument that development of livelihoods for returnees has profound 
implications on this process; the re-development of returnees’ livelihoods cultivates a 
sense of ownership, creates opportunities, and promotes conditions where individual 
economic viability collectively improves the broader community and by extension, the 
nation. The South Sudan case study supports the assumption that limited livelihood 
opportunities currently exist in this post-conflict nation. Reliance on areas that are ripe 
for development, however, may help a viable path for livelihood development. More 
specifically, agriculture has been the foundation of South Sudan’s historical economy and 
offers the most promising source of sustainable livelihoods, economic growth, and 
community development. South Sudan’s abundant and largely untapped arable land 
presents sustainable solutions for the transition from the relief phase to long-term growth, 
while also empowering returnees and creating community development. Thus, 
livelihoods not only provide the means for returnees to be self-sufficient but also 
encourage community through which stability is fostered. All of these outcomes are 
essential elements for the sustainability of emerging post-conflict nations. The pressures 
of reintegration in post-conflicts environments are constantly mounting; therefore, it is 
essential to focus more effectively on supporting the determinants for successful return, 
through long-term reintegration and recovery strategies—only then can post-conflict 
reintegration programs ensure sustainable stabilization and reconstruction.  
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